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INDIVIDUALS ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Beth Stephens*
INTRODUCTION
For traditionalists, the concept of individuals enforcing interna-
tional law has the whiff of an unpleasant oxymoron, implying a role
for individuals in a legal system in which, the traditionalists insist, only
sovereign states are legitimate players. From this perspective, individ-
ual efforts to enforce international law seem to conflict irreconcilably
with a venerable legal precept: international law is created and ap-
plied only by sovereign states. Within the United States, individual
involvement in international affairs also raises hackles. Defenders of
a centralized vision of foreign policy contend that such efforts contra-
dict the constitutional assignment of foreign affairs to the exclusive
control of the political branches of the government-the executive
branch and Congress.
As is often the case, there is less to both of these hoary precepts
than meets the eye. Individuals have long occupied an important po-
sition in the enforcement of international law, as objects of punish-
ment when they violate its mandates and as active agents seeking to
implement its rules. Similarly, U.S. foreign policy has never been im-
mune from the pressure and influence of individuals, nor could it or
should it be in a democracy.
Both of these supposed truisms have been invoked to challenge an
area in which I take particular interest, a series of federal lawsuits
seeking damages for violations of international law. Founded on a
1980 interpretation of a statute originally enacted in 1789, the cases
now also rely on three modern federal statutes.' These civil lawsuits
for human rights abuses have triggered great excitement within the
* Associate Professor. Rutgers-Camden School of Law. My thanks to the participants at
DePaul University College of Law's 2002 Robert A. Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social
Policy, as well as to Roger Clark and my colleagues at a Rutgers-Camden faculty workshop. for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. I should note that I have participated in several of the
human rights lawsuits discussed in this Article, as counsel for plaintiffs or as a consultant.
1. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), was originally enacted as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The three modern statutes are cited and discussed in the following
section.
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human rights community, viewed as an important step in the long-
term movement toward the enforcement of human rights norms. But
as the cases multiply and the range of defendants targeted widens to
include corporations, foreign governments, former and current politi-
cians, and the U.S. government, concerns have been raised about the
foreign policy implications. Criticism has recently focused on the
prominent role the cases offer to individual plaintiffs, the victims of
human rights abuses who initiate and control the civil litigation. This
litigation permits individuals to influence decisions that the executive
branch would prefer to decide based on political and diplomatic con-
cerns, an impact that has been labeled "plaintiff's diplomacy." 2 Critics
charge that such legal actions distort the structure of international law
and the balance of power among the branches of our federal govern-
ment, while threatening to undermine the measured progress of for-
eign relations.
Despite these somewhat apocalyptic claims, dozens of such lawsuits
have been litigated without any evidence that they have weakened the
structure of international law or threatened the coherence of our gov-
ernment's foreign policy, much less the foundations of the U.S. consti-
tutional system. Why the disconnect between reality and rhetoric?
One set of explanations points out that the volume of litigation is
actually quite low, that meritless cases are dismissed by judges, and
that any complications caused by individual "meddling" in foreign af-
fairs are minor and easily rectified by the executive branch.3 I agree
with all of these points, but choose in this Article to look at the role of
individuals in a broader historical and comparative context. Concerns
about the impact of human rights litigation on international law and
foreign affairs wrongly assume that individual involvement in foreign
affairs is novel and out of step with the governing paradigms of inter-
national law, with the practice in other jurisdictions, and with our own
legal traditions. To the contrary, individuals have historically occu-
pied an important role in the enforcement of international law and the
development of foreign policies in this country and abroad. Individu-
als play that role through nonjudicial means such as lobbying, demon-
2. The term was coined by an article of the same name that is supportive of most such litiga-
tion. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102. 103
(2000).
3. 1 exchanged views on these issues with Professors Curtis Bradley and David Bederman at
an April 2001 symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, with our papers later
published by the Chicago Journal of International Law. See David J. Bederman, International
Law Advocacy and its Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of
International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001): Beth Stephens. Taking
Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INi'L L. 485 (2001).
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strating, political organizing, and nonviolent resistance in addition to
international complaint procedures and domestic litigation.
In this Article, after first providing an overview of human rights
litigation in the United States, I explore the historical role of individu-
als in international law enforcement, on the international stage, and
within the United States and other domestic legal systems. It is im-
portant to note that these actions are not extralegal mechanisms. In-
dividuals are not taking the law into their own hands, hunting down
perpetrators and subjecting them to popular justice. Rather, each of
these actions are lawful, state-sanctioned enforcement mechanisms,
through which national and international bodies have empowered in-
dividuals to assist in the enforcement of the rights granted to them by
international law.
In some measure, these mechanisms reflect the recognition that
human rights are ultimately too important to be left to the unscru-
tinized domain of governments and government officials. Pragmatic
politicians need to be confronted by citizens who oppose the com-
promises of power. So-called private attorneys general, proudly prac-
ticing "plaintiff's diplomacy," are not just an unavoidable nuisance,
but rather an essential tool in the protection of basic human rights.
I. U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: INDIVIDUALS SEEKING
REDRESS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Recent controversy over the role of individuals in the enforcement
of international law has been triggered by a series of federal court
cases challenging human rights abuses committed both in the United
States and abroad. The cases stem from the Alien Tort Claims Act, a
once-obscure provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which states,
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."'4 Barely cited for almost two hun-
dred years, the statute rose to prominence after the 1980 decision in
Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala5 interpreted it as authorizing a civil claim by an
alien for the tort of torture.6 Three modern federal statutes have ex-
tended the right to sue for certain human rights violations to U.S. citi-
zens. Critics charge that these claims permit private individuals and
the judiciary to play a risky, even unconstitutional role in the develop-
ment and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
5. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. Id.
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Much about the deceptively simple Alien Tort Claims Act has been
subjected to relentless scrutiny and debate, including the statute's
original purpose and modern reach. In this section, I offer a brief
overview of the human rights litigation at the center of the current
policy debate, followed by a review of the legal and policy controver-
sies spurred by this line of cases.
A. The Fil~rtiga Precedent
After lying largely dormant for nearly two hundred years, over the
past twenty years the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has played a
prominent role in the global movement to hold accountable those who
violate human rights. The transformation of this statute began in
1980, with the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga. The case in-
volved the torture and murder of a seventeen-year-old Paraguayan in
Paraguay by a Paraguayan police officer. After discovering the perpe-
trator lived in New York City, the family sued the officer in U.S. fed-
eral court and eventually obtained a $10.4 million judgment against
him. The court held that the ATCA authorizes federal court suits for
universally recognized human rights violations, including torture, as
those rights are defined by modern international law. The statute ap-
plies whether or not the plaintiff or the events have links to the
United States, so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
The Fildrtiga precedent has been the foundation for dozens of law-
suits. The courts have held that jurisdiction is triggered when an alien
alleges a violation of a "universal, definable and obligatory" human
rights norm. 7 Recognized violations include genocide, war crimes,
summary execution, torture, and slavery, each as defined by interna-
tional law. Many of the cases follow the Filirtiga model, with a victim
suing an individual who personally committed a gross human rights
violation. Representative of these is the case filed by three Ethiopian
women who were brutally tortured during the Red Terror in Ethio-
pia.8 After one of them discovered their torturer working alongside
her in a hotel in Atlanta, they filed an ATCA claim against him. With
little hope of collecting money damages, their goals included the op-
portunity to confront him in court, create a record of his abusive past,
and facilitate their own recovery from the trauma they had suffered.
The courts have also developed standards based on international
law to determine who can be held accountable for an international law
7. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
8. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo. 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). cert. denied. 519 U.S. 830 (1996).
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violation. Liability has been imposed upon commanding officers, offi-
cials of de facto states, U.S. and local government officials, and corpo-
rations. In Xuncax v. Gramajo,9 for example, a Guatemalan general
was held liable for a widespread campaign of executions, torture, and
other abuses committed by forces under his command.10 Addition-
ally, the Ninth Circuit has held that the U.S. Immigration and Nation-
alization Service can be sued for violations of the internationally
protected rights of detainees. I'
A key turning point in the U.S. litigation came in 1995 when the
Second Circuit recognized that some international human rights
norms, such as the prohibition against genocide, apply to private ac-
tors. 12 In addition, the court held that where state action is required,
an individual can be held liable for acting in concert with government
officials, applying color of law principles developed pursuant to the
U.S. civil rights statutes.' 3 These holdings paved the way for litigation
against corporations, either for abuses that do not require state action
or for those committed in concert with government actors. The num-
ber of cases filed increased rapidly once it became possible to sue cor-
porations, in part because such defendants are far more likely than
individual foreigners to have assets to pay a judgment. None of the
corporate cases has yet produced a final judgment for plaintiffs, but
several preliminary rulings have upheld the legal proposition that the
ATCA applies to corporate defendants. A case against Royal Dutch
Shell Corporation for abuses allegedly committed in Nigeria, for ex-
ample, is currently in pretrial discovery after a series of rulings re-
jected challenges to personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and
the sufficiency of the allegations of corporate complicity in the human
rights violations.' 4
Approximately one hundred cases leading to decisions available on-
line have alleged jurisdiction under the ATCA and the related stat-
utes, with about twenty of these predating Fildrtiga. Of the total cases
filed, about one-third have been dismissed in the early stages for lack
of jurisdiction or claims of immunity. As noted by the Fildrtiga court,
9. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
10. Id.
11. See Papa v. United States. 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002).
12. Kadic v. Karadzic. 70 F.3d 232. 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
13. Id. at 245 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
14. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1402 (2001) (rejecting challenges to personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens): Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. Rico Bus. Disi'. GUIDE 10.216. 2002 WL 319887. at *13-14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28. 2002) (rejecting claim that complaint failed to state a claim against the corpo-
rate defendants).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
an allegation of a violation of international law is part of the jurisdic-
tional prerequisite for a case based on the ATCA; as a result, such
cases require a "more searching preliminary review" at the pleading
stage and will be dismissed if the complaint does not allege a univer-
sally recognized international law norm.1 5 Applying the strict stan-
dard, Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,' 6 for example, rejected a claim that the
company violated international law by acquiring property that had
earlier been wrongly expropriated by the Egyptian government, 17
while Wong-Opasi v. Tennessee State University18 dismissed an ATCA
claim based on state contract and tort law. 19 Cases have also been
dismissed on a finding of immunity from suit, including a lawsuit
against the government of Argentina for the bombing of a British oil
tanker during the Falklands War.20
Most of the successful ATCA cases allege egregious violations of
individual rights, such as genocide, summary execution, war crimes,
disappearance, or torture. Moreover, most of the successful cases in-
volve defendants who are either citizens or long-term residents of the
United States. A few have been filed against short-term residents and
at least one-Filrtiga-against an illegal alien living in this country,
but cases based on the transient presence of defendants traveling
through this country represent a small minority of the overall
litigation.
Three modern statutes also provide jurisdiction for human rights
claims in U.S. courts. The Torture Victim Protection Act,21 enacted in
1992, provides aliens or U.S. citizens a cause of action for torture or
extrajudicial execution committed "under color of foreign law."' 22 A
second statute, originally enacted in 1990 as part of an anti-terrorism
initiative, authorizes civil suits by U.S. nationals who are victims of
terrorism. 23
15. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
16. 239 F.3d 440, 447-50 (2d Cir. 2000).
17. Id.
18. 229 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 2000) (table case), No. 99-5660. No. 99-5668, 2000 WL 1182827. at
*2 (unpublished disposition).
19. Id.
20. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.. 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (dismissing
claim based on the immunities provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330. 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (1994).
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1994) (authorizing U.S. nationals injured by "an act of international
terrorism" to sue for treble damages).
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Finally, an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)2 4 permits U.S. citizens to sue a handful of foreign govern-
ments for torture, extrajudicial killing, and other abuses. The FSIA
exception responded to disappointment with failed efforts to sue for-
eign governments under the ATCA, the result of the 1989 Supreme
Court decision that human rights claims do not create an independent
exception to foreign sovereign immunity.2 5 Holding that Congress in-
tended the FSIA to cover the entire field, the Court ruled that suits
against foreign governments can proceed only if the claims fall within
one of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions to immunity. 26
Two later cases provoked strong congressional unease with this ap-
plication of sovereign immunity. In the first, Hugo Princz, a U.S. sur-
vivor of Nazi concentration camps, sued Germany for reparations; he
had been excluded from German compensation plans due to his U.S.
citizenship. Over a strong dissent by Judge Wald, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit found that sovereign immunity precluded the lawsuit. 27
Faced with movement in Congress to lift immunity in this case, Ger-
many reached a settlement with Princz. 28 Just a few years later, a law-
suit filed against Libya by the families of those killed in the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland was dismissed on the
basis of foreign sovereign immunity. This time, the families success-
fully lobbied Congress to create a new exception to the FSIA. Origi-
nally introduced as an across-the-board exception to immunity for
claims of torture, extrajudicial execution, and certain acts of terrorism,
a last-minute amendment reduced its scope. As enacted, U.S. citizens
may file such claims, but only against foreign governments that have
been designated by the U.S. government as "state sponsors of interna-
tional terrorism. ' '29 About a dozen such lawsuits have been litigated;
as discussed below, efforts to collect the resulting judgments by seizing
the assets of the defendant governments have triggered heated con-
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330. 1602-1611 (1994).
25. See Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428.
26. The exceptions are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (Supp. V 1999). See Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding human rights claim that
fell within the then-existing FSIA exceptions).
27. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany. 26 F.3d 1166, 1176-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald. J.,
dissenting).
28. See Kimberly J. McLarin, Holocaust Survivor Will Share $2.1 Million in Reparations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20. 1995, at B5.
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(7)(A), (B)(ii) (Supp. V. 1999). See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2000)
(designating seven states as sponsors of terrorism: Iran. Cuba, Syria. Iraq. Libya. Sudan. and
North Korea). The lobbying efforts that led to passage of the amendment are described in
ALLAN GERSON & GERRY ADLER. Ti-E PRICE OF TERROR: ONE BoMB. ONE PLANE. 270 LIVES.
THE HISiORY MAKING STRUGGLiE FOR JUSTICE AFTER PAN AM 103 (2001).
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frontations involving the judiciary, Congress, and the executive
branch.
B. The Current Controversy
Litigation based on these four statutes has triggered an extensive
academic debate. Critics claim the litigation affords private individu-
als and the judiciary an inappropriate, even unconstitutional, impact
on foreign policy. Curtis Bradley summarized his concerns in a recent
article:
The most significant cost of international human rights litigation is
that it shifts responsibility for official condemnation and sanction of
foreign governments away from elected political officials to private
plaintiffs and their representatives. The plaintiffs and their repre-
sentatives decide whom to sue, when to sue, and which claims to
bring. These actors, however, have neither the expertise nor the
constitutional authority to determine US foreign policy. Nor, unlike
our elected officials, will these actors have the incentive to weigh
the benefits of this litigation against its foreign relations costs. 30
Critics have pointed to several categories of cases as particularly
problematic. One central concern arises when cases address human
rights abuses by governments with which the United States govern-
ment is forging political and commercial ties, such as China. A lawsuit
against a top Chinese leader allegedly responsible for the 1989 massa-
cre of peaceful protesters in Tiananmen Square is frequently cited as
an example of improper interference with U.S. foreign policy.3 1 Brad-
ley worries that such human rights lawsuits "threaten to interfere
with" the executive branch's "carefully calibrated strategy" towards
China.32
Concern about the foreign policy implications of these cases also
arises from several controversial claims filed against corporations for
abuses committed during World War II. Although most of these cases
have been dismissed, they have contributed to political pressure for
settlements with German and Austrian banks, insurance companies,
and other businesses. Ann-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco worry
about the impact of such litigation on foreign relations. "In the past,
issues such as compensation for wartime crimes would have been
dealt with exclusively on a government-to-government level, exclud-
30. Bradley. supra note 3. at 460.
31. See Feng Suo Zhou v. Li Peng. Civ No. 00-6446. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14648 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2002) (order denying motion to quash service) (describing allegations of the complaint):
Edward Wong, Chinese Leader Sued in New York Over Deaths Stemming from Tiananmen
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 1. 2000. at A6.
32. Bradley. supra note 3, at 461.
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ing individuals. '33 These lawsuits, however, "forced the hands" of the
U.S., German, and Austrian governments: "The disputes were ulti-
mately settled through an amalgam of classic intergovernmental nego-
tiation and private discussion, but it was litigation that put the issue on
the agenda in the first place."' 34 This use of litigation as leverage in
settlement negotiations has led to criticism of the whole line of human
rights litigation.
Cases filed directly against foreign governments under the "state
sponsors of terrorism" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act have also triggered concern about interference with foreign pol-
icy. Commentators argue that judgments already totaling over three
billion dollars could complicate efforts to normalize diplomatic rela-
tions with some of the states on the list, tying the hands of future
diplomats, even if reformers come to power in any or all of the
targeted states and policies change. 35 The judgments also raise the
danger of retaliatory litigation against the government of the United
States. For example, in response to a judgment against Iran, that
country reportedly enacted legislation authorizing suit against the
United States for abuses committed during the 1953 coup d'etat.36 Ju-
dicial orders to pay judgments issued under this statute have pitted the
executive branch against the judiciary, with Congress frequently siding
with the plaintiffs and the judiciary. In response to difficulties in en-
forcing judgments, Congress passed a law to facilitate collection in
some of the lawsuits, but allowed the Executive to waive some of its
provisions. 37 Executive branch decisions to invoke waivers and to op-
pose judicial collection efforts have triggered angry responses from
both Congress and the courts.
Pinpointing the responsibility for creating these potential conflicts,
as well as the recommendations for responding to them, depends upon
the nature of the statute giving rise to the litigation. The legal issues
33. Slaughter & Bosco. supra note 2. at 108.
34. /d.
35. See Daveed Gartenstein- Ross. Note, Resolving Outstanding Judgments Under the Terror-
ism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 496. 497-500, 515-16
(2002) (discussing size of judgments and difficulties they pose to normalization of diplomatic
relations).
36. See Tehran to Set Up Special Court for Lawsuits Against the U.S., AGENCE FR. PRESSE.
Nov. 15, 2000. available at 2002 WL 24759851 (last visited Nov. 15. 2002): Iran MPs Cry "Down
with America,'" Approve Lawsuits Against United States. AGENCE FR. PRESSE. Nov. 1, 2000,
available at 2002 WL 24749300 (last visited Nov. 15. 2002).
37. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-386. §§ 2002.
2003. 114 Stat. 1541. 1541-43 (2000): Gartenstein-Ross. supra note 35. at 515 n.102. Gartenstein-
Ross details the byzantine maneuvering in the courts and Congress over these judgments. Id. at
517 n.113.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
surrounding the three modern statutes are relatively straightforward
and their constitutionality is not in doubt. Each was enacted by a
modern Congress, with extensive legislative history, and the courts are
able to rely on current sources to interpret congressional intent. To
the extent that cases triggered by any of the statutes cause foreign
policy concerns, both responsibility for the problem and the power to
rectify the situation rest squarely with Congress, which enacted the
legislation, and the executive branch, which signed the statutes into
law.
By contrast, interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act requires
both a review of scattered historical documents and an understanding
of eighteenth century attitudes towards international law, civil and
criminal claims, and the Constitution. This effort has produced a pro-
digious amount of academic scholarship, 38 while at the same time the
federal judiciary has shown remarkable agreement on the core mean-
ing of the statute. The courts have generally agreed that the statute
affords a cause of action as well as jurisdiction and delegates to the
federal courts the task of defining the exact nature of the permissible
claim. This approach was summarized succinctly by the Ninth Circuit:
"We start with the face of the statute. It requires a claim by an alien, a
tort, and a violation of international law."' 39 As stated by the Eleventh
Circuit: "Congress, of course, may enact a statute that confers on the
federal courts jurisdiction over a particular class of cases while dele-
gating to the courts the task of fashioning remedies that give effect to
the federal policies underlying the statute. '40
Some scholars have disagreed with this interpretation. They point
to the sparse language of the statute and the limited historical record,
and accuse the judiciary of creating an individual cause of action that
was not intended by Congress. Under this view, the judiciary bears
the responsibility for the foreign policy tensions attributed to ATCA
claims. This criticism, however, misses one of the few points of agree-
ment about the meaning of the statute. For in the midst of much de-
bate about the origins and meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act,
there seems to be no doubt that the statute, when enacted, was in-
tended to authorize individuals to seek damages for injuries caused by
a violation of the law of nations. This undisputed issue is central to
my discussion, so I will highlight it in a section of its own.
38. A Westlaw search for "Filartiga or 'Alien Tort' conducted in July 2002 produced 1419
hits in the Journals and Law Reviews database.
39. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493. 499 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied. 508 U.S. 972 (1993).
40. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848.
[Vol. 52:433
2002]INDIVIDUALS ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 443
C. Individuals and International Law: A Point of Consensus
The eighteenth century leaders of our emerging nation apparently
concluded that permitting individuals to seek compensation for viola-
tions of international law would further, not hinder, our foreign pol-
icy. Their recognition of the importance of private damage claims
provides an important counterpoint to modern efforts to subjugate
such individual actions to the federal government's centralized control
over foreign policy.
In the decade preceding ratification of the Constitution, the leaders
of the embattled Confederation expressed growing concern about
their inability to enforce the nation's international law obligations.
This weakness, which threatened to draw the country into war with
nations offended by unsanctioned violations of international law, was
one of the motivating forces behind the decision to reframe the rela-
tionship among the states. At an early session of the Constitutional
Convention, for example, Edmund Randolph complained that the
Confederation risked being dragged into foreign wars because Con-
gress "could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations,
to be punished;" as a result, the states "might by their conduct pro-
voke war without controul [sic]." '4'
Although no specific legislative records have been uncovered, the
ATCA appears to derive from a series of resolutions passed by the
Continental Congress, each responding to the inability of the national
government to enforce international law. The various proposals to
strengthen enforcement of international law norms included a mix of
criminal and civil actions, with injured individuals granted an impor-
tant role in protecting their own rights. In 1781, for example, a con-
gressional committee report noted the problems created by the states'
failure to prosecute violations of the law of nations.42 The report rec-
ommended state criminal prosecutions, but also proposed that if indi-
viduals were harmed by such a violation, "the author of those injuries
should compensate the damage out of his private fortune. '43 A con-
gressional resolution then recommended that when international law
was violated, the states should both initiate criminal prosecutions and
41. See Madison's Notes, May 29. 1787, in I THE Ri CORDS OF THfE FEDERAL CONVENTION Oi
1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed.. 1937). Jack Rakove has emphasized the centrality of this concern:
-[B]efore 1787 it was the inability of the existing Continental Congress to frame and implement
adequate foreign policies that evoked the most telling criticisms of the 'imbecility' of the Articles
of Confederation." Jack N. Rakove. Making Foreign Policy - The Vie", front 1787, in FOREIC;N
POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION I. 2 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds.. 1990).
42. Edmund Randolph et al., Report to Congress (1781). in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
66 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.. 1987).
43. Id.
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"authorise [sic] suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured,
and for compensation to the United States for damage sustained by
them from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen. ' 44 In appar-
ent response, a 1782 Connecticut law afforded a civil tort remedy for
injuries to foreign states or their citizens caused by a violation of inter-
national law as well as establishing criminal penalties. 45
These efforts to rely on the states to punish international law viola-
tions were largely a failure. The Constitution relied instead on the
establishment of federal courts with jurisdiction over violations of in-
ternational law. The First Congress enacted a crime bill that imposed
criminal sanctions for certain violations of the law of nations includ-
ing, for example, to "assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any other
manner infract the law of nations, by offering violence to the person
of an ambassador or other public minister .... ",46 But, in keeping
with the criminal/civil remedy approach, the First Congress also en-
acted the Alien Tort Claims Act, providing that an individual harmed
by a violation of international law could sue in federal court for dam-
ages. This mixed approach to international law violations, encompass-
ing both criminal prosecution of the perpetrator and compensation to
those injured through a civil suit, would have been familiar to the
founding generation. Early U.S. law, both state and federal, em-
ployed a fluid mix of civil and criminal actions to sanction violations
of the law.
The public/private, civil/criminal approach also reflected eighteenth
century views of international law and the role of the individual
within it. The following section looks at the international law context,
discussing first the historical background and then reviewing the ex-
panding role of individuals enforcing international law in international
tribunals, particularly over the past fifty years. The subsequent sec-
44. Id. at 66-67.
45. See An Act to Prevent Infractions of the Law of Nations. May. 1782, in 4 THE PUBLIC
RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE YEAR 1782. at 156-57 (L. Larabee ed..
1942); William R. Casto, Correspondence, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902-03 (1989). The Connecticut
statute was drafted by Oliver Ellsworth who later, as a member of Congress, drafted the ATCA.
See id. at 902-03; WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 27-53 (1995).
46. The Crime Bill of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 28. 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (1790). Further codification
was unnecessary at the time since the federal courts exercised the power to punish common law
crimes until the Supreme Court held otherwise in 1816. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 415, 416-17 (1816): United States v. Hudson. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). Several early
prosecutions were based on common law violations of the law of nations without congressional
codification of the crime. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 161 (1795): Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 474 (1793): Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099. 1108 (C.C.D. Pa.
1793) (No. 6360).
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tion takes a comparative perspective, looking at comparable actions in
other domestic legal systems. I thereby return to my central point:
although the mode of seeking relief varies widely, individual enforce-
ment of international law norms is neither a new phenomenon, nor
unique to the United States.
II. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Debates about the role of individuals in international law trigger
heated exchanges. Are individuals "subjects" or "objects" of interna-
tional law? Do individuals have "international legal personality"? At
one extreme, commentators argue that international law is solely a
matter of state-to-state relations, that states define and enforce inter-
national norms with individuals enjoying only those rights granted to
them by governments. At the other extreme, scholars assert that indi-
viduals are the exclusive subjects and architects of international law,
while states are nothing more than the sum of the individuals who
compose them.47
As with many entrenched disagreements, the debate disintegrates in
large part into a battle of contradictory definitions of subject, object,
and legal personality. Looking behind the conflicting terminology,
there is room for surprising agreement in practice about the many
functions individuals actually assume in the enforcement of interna-
tional law. Fundamental to identifying common ground is the recog-
nition that not all actors play the same roles on the international law
stage. As the International Court of Justice noted long ago, "The sub-
jects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their
nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon
the needs of the community. ' 48 Thus, recognizing that individuals
have certain rights and duties under international law does not imply
that those attributes are identical to those of states. International law
is largely a product of state-to-state negotiation. Individuals, how-
ever, have long asserted both rights and duties under international law
and clearly play an important role in the development and enforce-
ment of that law, a role that has grown rapidly over the past sixty
years.
47. For a detailed historical review of the varied positions on these questions, see Marek St.
Korowicz, 7he Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533
(1956).
48. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174. 178
(Apr. 11).
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Ancient scholars had little difficulty understanding the role of indi-
viduals within international law. Viewing international law as
originating in part from religious or natural law sources, they recog-
nized that such norms applied directly to govern the conduct of indi-
viduals. 49 Through the end of the eighteenth century, international
norms and sanctions were viewed as founded upon religious belief as
well as social custom and reason. This set of sources led to the all-
encompassing system of international rules described by William
Blackstone as founded upon "maxims and customs... of higher antiq-
uity than memory or history can reach" and construed by reference to
"the law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all the
contracting parties are equally conversant and to which they are
equally subject."' 50 These rules governed all interactions among for-
eign states and their citizens, not just those between sovereign states:
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason,
and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants
of the world; in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremo-
nies and civilities, and to insure the observance of justice and good
faith in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two
or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to each. 51
Within this system, private individuals bore important and enforcea-
ble rights. The entire set of rules governing commercial and property
transactions was enforced through private claims. Offenses could be
sanctioned through both criminal prosecutions and private claims for
compensation. 52 Blackstone's summary of international law enforce-
ment thus provides for both criminal punishment of individual viola-
tors and enforceable rights for individuals harmed by such
violations.53
Punishment of individuals who violate international law has been a
consistent feature of the system. Piracy, for example, a crime that has
been outlawed by international law for centuries, is by definition com-
mitted by individuals acting without state authorization. Writing in
the eighteenth century, Blackstone listed piracy as one of the "princi-
49. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 48-87 (2001).
50. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67 (Wayne Morri-
son ed., 2001) (1753) [hereinafter 4 BLACKSTONE].
51. Id. at *66.
52. Id. at *66-72.
53. Thus, Blackstone noted that several contemporaneous statutes offered "restitution" and
-amends" to the victim of a violation, in tandem with criminal prosecutions. Id. at *69-70. "[I]f
any of the king's subjects attempt or offend upon the sea. [the justices] may cause full restitution
and amends to be made to the party injured." Id. Blackstone provided a list of eighteenth cen-
tury criminal sanctions and civil remedies available to punish individuals who violated interna-
tional law and to compensate private persons who were harmed by the violations.
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pal offenses against the law of nations .... -154 The slave trade has
been outlawed by international law since the nineteenth century, a
prohibition that applied equally to states and individuals. 55 Interna-
tionally sanctioned punishment of pirates and slave traders provided
the model for punishment of war crimes and other universally con-
demned acts in the twentieth century. As the Nuremberg Tribunal
stated after World War II, "[T]hat international law imposes duties
and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been
recognized .... Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced. 56
Individuals have long played an important role in the enforcement
of international law as well. For centuries, private citizens whose
rights were violated by the citizens of another state could apply to
their own sovereign for permission to seek a private remedy through
the use of force-a self-help process carefully regulated by the rules of
reprisal.5 7 Reprisal was authorized only where the original offense was
unlawful and other peaceful measures to obtain satisfaction had
failed. Grover Clark noted that analogous state-sanctioned private
remedies were common in English domestic practice in the centuries
before the national government was capable of enforcing the law
among residents of different towns.58 On the international stage, na-
tional governments similarly authorized private reprisals where they
could not otherwise offer remedies for their citizens.
Reprisals were the peacetime version of privateering, the officially
authorized plunder of enemy ships during war. Rules regulating the
conduct of war at sea constituted the most important area governed
by international law until the early twentieth century. An extraordi-
narily complex body of law developed to determine which vessels-
and what portions of their cargo-could be seized, as well as who had
the right to litigate the validity of a seizure and in which domestic
courts. In general, elaborate rules protected neutral vessels from at-
54. Id. at *68.
55. For a discussion of the gradual development of international rules barring slavery and the
slave trade, see Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg's Amistad and Other Things I Have Thought
About in the Past Fort, Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of Laws, Insurance and
Slavery, 30 RUiGERS L.J. 371. 383-410 (1999).
56. Judgment, in 22 TRIAL (OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411, 465-66 (1948).
57. See the extensive discussion of the rules regulating reprisals in Grover Clark. The English
Practice with Regard to Reprisals be Private Persons, 27 Ai. J. INT'L L. 694 (1933).
58. Id. at 704-05.
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tack, while those affiliated with enemy states were subject to seizure-
but multiple issues complicated this simple structure, including the
status of neutral cargo on enemy ships and enemy cargo on neutral
ships, the standing of enemy aliens, and the difficulty of determining
the nationality of certain vessels.
The law of naval prize has an extraordinarily rich history, longer
and deeper than perhaps any other discrete subject matter in the
law of nations . . . . This area of law mattered to early modern
States. Affected individuals took pains to know their rights and ob-
ligations in times of war. They kept records on the capture practices
not only of their own nation, but also those of their neighbors and
of the great maritime powers. It would not be extravagant to say
that the development of the law of maritime prize was paradigmatic
of the role of custom and state practice in the formative centuries of
international law. For many of those years, the law of prize was the
law of nations. 59
This entire set of rules was largely enforced through individual actors
who were empowered to seize and keep ships and cargo-but re-
quired to defend their actions in prize courts.
Thus, although traditionalists emphasize the state-to-state founda-
tion of international legal relations, individuals have both asserted
rights and been subject to international duties for centuries. As
Korowicz concluded, "The idea that international law rules not only
the intercourse of independent states but also that its provisions are
directly binding on individuals without the intermediary of their state,
is at least as old as the science of international law .... 60
During the nineteenth century, influenced by the rise of positivism,
international law was gradually redefined to focus on state-to-state re-
lations. Those who viewed international law as purely statist came to
dominate the international law discourse. Private international inter-
actions were relegated to a separate discipline and individual rights
and duties under public international law downplayed. Positivists dis-
missed the moral, natural law basis of international obligations, only
recognizing the validity of agreements accepted by states, the only ac-
tors recognized as subjects of international law. As stated by Oppen-
heim in 1955, "Since the Law of Nations is primarily a law between
States, States are, to that extent, the only subjects of the Law of
Nations. "61
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, individuals have
regained their historical role in that system. Indeed, for nearly one
59. David J. Bederman. The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 31. 33 (1995).
60. Korowicz, supra note 47, at 534.
61. L. OPPENHEIM. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (Lauterpacht ed.. 8th ed. 1955).
[Vol. 52:433
2002]INDIVIDUALS ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 449
hundred years, treaties have provided for individual petition mecha-
nisms, allowing individuals to assert their rights directly in interna-
tional tribunals.62 Beginning early in the twentieth century, bilateral
and multilateral treaties authorized individuals to file complaints al-
leging violations of treaty rights. The early international courts recog-
nized private rights of action to enforce treaty provisions. Operating
from 1908-1918, for example, the short-lived Central American Court
of Justice was the first international tribunal to permit private parties
to raise violations of treaties and other international norms.
The horrors of World War II triggered a revolutionary expansion of
internationally protected individual rights. Most importantly, interna-
tional law recognized that individuals have the right to protection
from their own government. The world community has now acknowl-
edged universally binding norms prohibiting egregious violations such
as genocide, torture, and slavery, as well as war crimes and crimes
against humanity. These developments have put to rest the argument
that only the state can define or enforce its citizens' rights on the in-
ternational stage.
Since World War II, several multilateral treaties have created indi-
vidual petition mechanisms that authorize private individuals to file
complaints against states alleging violations of international law. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for ex-
ample, sets forth a series of government obligations to respect and
protect "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family."'63 The ICCPR bars discrimination and physical abuses, such
as torture, while guaranteeing basic rights, including freedom of asso-
ciation and expression and political participation. An optional proto-
col to the ICCPR, ratified by over one hundred countries, authorizes
the United Nations Human Rights Committee to receive complaints
from individuals alleging violations of these rights. Similar individual
petition systems have been established pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination as well as by regional human rights agree-
ments for Europe, the Americas, and Africa.64
62. For discussions of the earliest examples. see IAN BROWNLIE. PRINCIrLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 554-55. 584-85 (4th ed. 1990): P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Indi-
viduals in International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, I J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 151. 158-66 (1992).
63. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Dec. 19, 1966. 999 U.N.T.S.
172 [hereinafter ICCPR].
64. For an overview of these individual enforcement mechanisms, see Antonio Augusto Can-
cado Trindade, The Consolidation of the Procedural Capacity of Individuals in the Evolution of
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Each of these treaties is also monitored through reporting require-
ments; member states are required to submit regular reports detailing
their compliance with the treaty obligations. However, the individual
petition system is central to the international approach to human
rights. "The essence of the international protection of human rights is
the opposition of individual complainants to respondent states in cases
of alleged violations of the protected rights. '65
There is still debate about the source of human rights, pitting the
positivist view that such rights are granted by states through interna-
tional treaties and custom against the view that human beings have
inherent rights by virtue of their humanity. Regardless of the ultimate
source, it is now clear that international law protects each individual's
right to be free of gross human rights violations and affords various
mechanisms by which individuals can assert their rights.
Moreover, despite the rhetoric of the positivist era, individuals were
never completely displaced from a role in enforcing international law.
National legal systems have consistently permitted enforcement of in-
ternational rights. Much enforcement takes place through these do-
mestic legal systems, which incorporate and implement international
law mandates through mechanisms appropriate to the peculiarities of
their legal structures. This domestic enforcement also affords a cen-
tral role to individuals as actors seeking implementation of interna-
tional law norms.
III. INDIVIDUALS ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
International law is now enforced by a far-flung network of global,
regional and national institutions. But for centuries, domestic legal
systems were the only means by which international law could be en-
forced. As noted by the Supreme Court over two hundred years ago,
"[T]he law of nations, or of nature and reason, is ... enforced by...
the municipal law of the country; which latter may . . . facilitate or
improve the execution of its decisions, by any means they shall think
best, provided the great universal law remains unaltered. '66
National enforcement has continued to play a central role in the
development and implementation of international law, even as global
and regional systems have multiplied. One reason for these overlap-
ping jurisdictions is the weakness of international mechanisms. In the
the International Protection of Human Rights: Present State and Perspectives at the Turn of the
Century, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1 (1998).
65. Id. at 7.
66. Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160. 162 (1792).
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absence of a global government equipped with effective enforcement
mechanisms, international law by necessity must be implemented by
national bodies. But domestic enforcement of international law is not
just a response to the weakness of the international legal system.
Even in a world governed by global institutions, national legal systems
would play an important role in the incorporation of international
standards into domestic law. The European system provides one ex-
ample: the continent boasts a strong and effective regional system, but
national judiciaries remain the first line of defense for international
norms.
Analysis of U.S. human rights litigation often assumes that in per-
mitting such claims the United States is out on a limb, unsupported by
the practices of any other nation. In fact, the U.S. line of cases bears
important similarities to legal approaches that are underway in several
nations and developing just as rapidly as the U.S. precedents.
First, civil lawsuits have been filed in several common law legal sys-
tems challenging corporate abuses committed by domestic corpora-
tions in their operations abroad. One case filed in England, for
example, charged that a British asbestos corporation had permitted its
foreign subsidiary in South Africa to operate in a way that endangered
the health of black workers and their families.67 The plaintiffs alleged
that the company forced black workers into the most dangerous jobs,
without health care, while white workers were protected from the as-
bestos dust and received proper health care. 68 A similar case filed
against a British chemical company, Thor Chemical Holdings, resulted
in a series of settlements that compensated South African workers
poisoned by mercury. 69 The plaintiffs alleged that faced with health
and safety problems in England, the defendant moved its operations
to South Africa, where it "recycled" workers-replacing contami-
nated workers when their mercury levels rose too high-rather than
instituting the protections that would have been required in
England.71
Although properly styled as violations of domestic law, these law-
suits share the goals of much human rights litigation: holding account-
able those who violate the fundamental rights of individuals around
67. See Lubbe v. Cape PLC. 4 All E.R. 268 (H.L. 2000) (reversing lower court order dis-
missing case based on forum non conveniens): 7orv Advisers Try to Sabotage Court Case, THE
INDEP.. Feb. 4, 1999. at 1-2 (discussing underlying facts of plaintiffs' claims).
68. Lubbe. 4 All E. R. 268.
69. See Richard Meeran. Accountabilit
, 
of Transnationals for Human Rights Abuses, 148 NEW
L.J. 1686 (Nov. 13, 1998). 148 NEW L.J. 1706 (Nov. 20. 1998) (detailing allegations of this and
other suits against corporations).
70. See Meeran. supra note 69.
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the world. Claims in the United States that might be styled as interna-
tional law violations have been filed as negligence claims in England,
Canada, and Australia. 71 This litigation strategy may be necessitated
by the absence of domestic statutory authorization such as that pro-
vided by the Alien Tort Claims Act.72
Second, civil lawsuits in the United States have much in common
with privately initiated criminal prosecutions in civil law legal systems.
These similarities are often overlooked because of a tendency among
domestic lawyers to assume that the lines dividing the categories of
criminal and civil are fixed and definable and are constant across dif-
ferent legal systems. In fact, such lines are difficult to pin down even
within a single legal system and do not transfer automatically from
one system to another.
It is not surprising that these distinctions would vary across national
lines. Even within legal systems, they are hard to define. In the
United States, the civil/criminal divide has important constitutional
consequences: defendants in criminal proceedings have the right to a
panoply of constitutional protections that are not afforded to civil liti-
gants. Despite repeated efforts, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has
not been able to draw a clear line.73 The European regional system
has confronted similar difficulties in applying criminal law protections
to procedures that originate in diverse domestic legal systems. Rather
than rely upon the domestic label, the European Court of Human
Rights conducts an independent inquiry to determine the proper clas-
sification of legal actions. In deciding whether a proceeding is prop-
erly classified as criminal rather than civil, the court considers whether
the purpose of the proceedings is "deterrent and punitive" and
whether the sanction imposed is "in its nature and degree" appropri-
ate "to the 'criminal' sphere. '74
Similar issues underlie scholarly efforts to draw a theoretical line
between civil and criminal proceedings. Among the factors consid-
ered by commentators are whether sanctions are imposed for the pur-
71. See Meeran, supra note 69; Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability
Through National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
451. 456-58 (2001) (listing cases).
72. See TORTURE AS TORT (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (containing a series of essays that review
the possibilities of bringing claims directly as international law violations). See also Human
Rights Committee, International Law Association (British Branch), Report on Civil Actions in
the English Courts for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad, reprinted in 2001 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 129 (discussing the possibility of civil human rights litigation in England).
73. Modern Supreme Court efforts to classify actions for constitutional purposes have been
described as "an incoherent muddle." Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Juris-
prudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1998).
74. Ozturk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3, 52, 50 (1984).
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pose of punishment and moral condemnation or for compensation and
whether the proceedings are controlled by a private party or the gov-
ernment. But these factors vary widely over time and among legal
systems. As David Friedman has concluded, "[O]utside of the acci-
dents of a particular legal system at a particular time, there is no natu-
ral category of tort or crime and thus no essential distinction. '75
Having spent many years explaining U.S. human rights litigation to
baffled colleagues from many countries, I now understand all too
clearly the importance of understanding these comparative differ-
ences. "Civil" and "criminal" mean different things in different legal
systems. Consider here two of the overlapping and shifting lines often
used to delineate the difference.
One commonly identified distinction between civil actions and
criminal prosecutions is a difference in the purpose of a judgment:
civil actions are said to be designed to compensate the injured party,
without any attendant moral condemnation of the offender, while
criminal actions aim to punish the guilty party for morally blamewor-
thy conduct. United States tort actions, however, particularly those
that include punitive damages, are designed to deter and punish as
well as to compensate, and entail moral condemnation. As the Su-
preme Court said in the late nineteenth century, "The principle of per-
mitting damages, in certain cases, to go beyond naked compensation,
is for example, and the punishment of the guilty party for the wicked,
corrupt, and malignant motive and design which prompted him to the
wrongful act."'76
On the other hand, criminal prosecutions in many countries include
the possibility of monetary compensation to those injured by the crim-
inal acts.77 In some systems, compensation is an automatic feature of a
criminal prosecution. In others, compensation is obtained by means
of a coordinated civil suit, attached to the criminal prosecution and
relying on the facts developed at the criminal trial. In such systems, if
acts are subject to criminal prosecution, it may not be necessary for a
private person to undertake an independent civil action for
compensation.
75. David Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (1996).
76. Beckwith v. Bean. 98 U.S. 266, 277 (1878).
77. See generally J.A. Jolowicz, Procedural Questions, in I I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 13. at 5-11 (Andre Tunc ed., 1986) (describing the interdependence of
civil and criminal actions in many legal systems): Matti Joutsen. Listening to the Victim: The
Victim's Role in European Criminal Justice Systems, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 95. 115-18 (1987)
(describing partie civile system that is in effect in many European legal systems).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Another traditional distinction between criminal and civil actions
focuses on the party in charge of the proceeding: public prosecutors
handle criminal prosecutions while private parties litigate torts. A sig-
nificant difference between civil human rights litigation and criminal
prosecutions in the United States is the fact that private plaintiffs con-
trol civil lawsuits while government prosecutors generally conduct
prosecutions. But comparative analysis also blurs the public/private
distinction. In many civil law legal systems, private parties can file
and even prosecute criminal proceedings. 78 Moreover, criminal prose-
cutions in many systems rely upon an inquiry conducted by an investi-
gating magistrate; those magistrates may operate with a great deal of
independence from the executive branch of their governments. The
Spanish prosecution of Augusto Pinochet, which led to the attempt to
extradite him from England, illustrates both of these strands of inde-
pendence: the prosecution was initiated by private parties over the
objection of the public prosecutors, and the investigation was con-
ducted by a magistrate despite the opposition of the country's execu-
tive branch. 79
Examples of such privately initiated, magistrate-driven prosecutions
for human rights violations are common across Europe; in addition,
one is underway in Paraguay, while another was filed but later dis-
missed in Senegal. As with the Pinochet case, the potential for embar-
rassment of the political branches of the government is high. A
criminal case filed against Ariel Sharon in Belgium, for example,
charges him with responsibility for the massacre of hundreds of Pales-
tinians in refuge camps in Lebanon. Approximately thirty similar pri-
vate criminal complaints have been filed in Belgium, under a broad
criminal jurisdiction statute that permitted criminal prosecutions for
universal crimes committed anywhere in the world, even where the
defendant was not present in Belgium at the time the complaint was
filed.80
78. See Joutsen, supra note 77. at 110-14 (comparing private prosecution in several European
systems): Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform:
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV.
539, 613 n.400, 669-70 (1990) (describing the French system of privately initiated prosecutions).
79. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza. The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 311. 311-12 (2001).
80. A Belgian court has recently reinterpreted the statute to require the physical presence of
the defendant, a ruling that is currently under appeal. A proposal currently under discussion
would limit the physical presence requirement to private prosecutions filed after July I ,2002, the
date on which the statute of the International Criminal Court came into force. For discussion of
the Belgian court decision, see http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/lndex/MDE151012002?OpenDocu-
ment&of=THEMES\INTERNATIONAL+JUSTICE (last visited July 24. 2002). For discussion
of proposal to amend Belgian law. see The Belgian Law of Universal Jurisdiction: A Second
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Private criminal prosecutions may also be filed against corporations.
A new, non-profit organization in France was formed for the sole pur-
pose of pursuing criminal human rights prosecutions against corpora-
tions. Its first prosecution was filed in March 2002 against a French
corporation, alleging illegal plundering of resources in Cameroon.81
Criminal investigations have also been initiated in Belgium against an
oil company for activities in Burma. 82
Although rare today, private sanctions for criminal violations were
common in the early years of the U.S. legal system. Criminal laws
were enforced through a system of private claims as well as by public
criminal prosecutions.8 3 As the Supreme Court noted in 1805, "Al-
most every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered
by an action of debt as well as by information. '8 4 This mixture of
private and public enforcement continued into the twentieth century:
"The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is
frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action,
although he has no interest in the matter whatever except as such in-
former. '85 Such private enforcement actions addressed violations of
the public trust as well as private crimes. Although less common to-
day, several states continue to recognize private prosecutions in lim-
ited circumstances.86
Civil human rights litigation in the United States bears a strong re-
semblance to actions termed criminal in other nations. These exam-
ples indicate that private parties are engaged in the enforcement of
international human rights norms in the domestic courts of many na-
tions. In the United States, such efforts are limited to civil lawsuits.
Wind, at http://www.fidh.org (last visited July 24, 2002). For list of defendants currently facing
privately initiated criminal investigations in Belgian. see Une trentaine de dirigeants vises par la
loi beige de compitence universelle, AcENCE FR. PRESSE. June 26, 2002 (Fr.).
81. See 7 Cameroonian Farmers Confront the French Rougier Group and it Cameroonian
Affiliate SFID Before French Tribunal, at http://www.amisdelaterr.org/actu/2002/2002-03-26.html
(last visited July 24, 2002).
82. See TotalFina Elf Faces Lawsuit by Mvanmar Refugees Over Govt Human Rights Abuses. at
http://www. ananova. corn/business/story/sm_583620. html?menu +business. latestheadlines (last
visited July 24, 2002).
83. See Beth Stephens. Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Pun-
ish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447. 508-17 (2000)
(discussing intertwined criminal and civil remedies in eighteenth and nineteenth century U.S.
legal system).
84. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336. 341 (1805).
85. Marvin v. Trout. 199 U.S. 212. 225 (1905).
86. Alabama, Georgia. Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania. Tennessee, Vermont. Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin allow privately compensated attorneys to play various roles in criminal
prosecutions. Matthew S. Nichols. No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private
Prosecutors, 13 CAv. DEF. J. 279. 282 n.14 (2001).
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In many countries, they are more likely to entail privately initiated
criminal prosecutions, requests to magistrates to open investigations,
or civil claims attached to criminal prosecutions.
These varied approaches reflect the diversity and strength of na-
tional legal systems as a means to enforce international law. All of
these actions are part of the expanding international movement to-
ward accountability for violations of international law. In each, the
individual plays a key role as an enforcer of international norms.
Each domestic legal system implements the international norms in a
manner consistent with its local procedures. 87 The transnational ap-
proach "affirms the role of domestic institutions in enforcing interna-
tional obligations and acknowledges the critical role of individuals in
this process. ' ' 8  Despite our unique line of civil litigation, the United
States has significant company in this growing trend towards private
enforcement of international law in domestic courts.
IV. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE: HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
AND FOREIGN POLICY
Primary control over U.S. foreign policy is assigned to the political
branches of our government, the executive branch in collaboration
with Congress. Despite this delegation and the deference it is gener-
ally accorded, individuals play important roles in prodding and push-
ing the government toward preferred foreign policy positions. One
means by which this is accomplished is litigation. Indeed, in a law-
abiding society such as ours, it would be surprising if lawsuits were not
used in this way. Equally unsurprising, the judiciary has developed
means by which to protect the political branches from interference in
these delegated tasks. In this section, I look first at the history of for-
eign policy litigation, and then at the political question doctrine. I
then briefly review the supposedly dangerous human rights cases, con-
cluding that they pose no threat to U.S. foreign policy or to the politi-
cal branches' management of that policy.
87. 1 have elsewhere labeled this process the "translation" of international obligations into
domestic law. Beth Stephens. Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analy-
sis Of Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(2002).
88. William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and
the Move Toward A Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129,
132 (2000).
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A. The Historical Context: Individuals Impacting Foreign Policy
Human rights cases may be filed with the direct intent to influence
both the development of international law and the foreign policy of
the United States and other countries. In some cases, this goal is
sought through the imposition of damage awards. In others, collec-
tion of damages is unlikely, at best; plaintiffs may seek broad policy
goals as well as personal satisfaction. Some may even see the litiga-
tion as leverage to achieve settlements with the defendants, as has
been alleged about several of the Holocaust lawsuits.
Such mixed motives are hardly unique to human rights litigation.
Many private litigants employ litigation as a tactic in a larger struggle,
seeking to exert pressure towards a favorable settlement. Indeed,
such strategic use of litigation has become a standard in business rela-
tions, where lawsuits are used as "a weapon in business competi-
tion."89 The impact on the court system of "scorched earth" business
litigation is many magnitudes higher than that of the several dozen
human rights cases filed over the past two decades.
Moreover, in contrast to the purely private goals of business litiga-
tion, human rights lawsuits belong to a public interest tradition in
which advocates have long used civil litigation as part of broad cam-
paigns aimed at legal and political reform. In recognition of the simi-
larities between human rights litigation and U.S. civil rights lawsuits,
Fildrtiga has been called the Brown v. Board of Education of transna-
tional law litigation, 90 a powerful reminder of the reform potential of
civil litigation.
Litigation, of course, is not the only means by which individuals
seek to influence foreign policy in ways that have at times pleased
government officials but, just as often, have frustrated and infuriated
them. Indeed, the Alien Tort Claims Act is thought to have been a
reaction in part to the diplomatic uproar caused when a French citi-
zen, Charles de Longchamps, insulted a French diplomat, Francis
89. Bryant Garth. From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Pro-
fession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931. 943 (1993). Garth concludes:
The recognition that litigation is often merely a weapon in business competition has
become almost commonplace .... Settlement out of court is the paradigmatic result of
big litigation. Teams of lawyers, working feverishly, use the tools of discovery and mo-
tion practice to try to raise the settlement value of their side of the case. The result of
the new era of business and professional competition in the 1970s and 1980s. in sum,
was scorched earth litigation, undertaken largely for business reasons, which lead to
settlements out of court.
Id. at 943-44.
90. Harold Hongju Koh. Transnational Public Law Litigation. 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
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Marbois, in Philadelphia. The furious Marbois later arranged a meet-
ing on the street at which de Longchamps assaulted him-by striking
his cane. 91 The commotion triggered by this minor incident nearly
provoked war between France and the fledgling Confederation. 92 De
Longchamps was apparently upset about Marbois's failure to authen-
ticate official French government documents, a consular duty. He ex-
pressed his anger not through a lawsuit, but through direct action,
seeking out Marbois, berating him, and finally resorting to violence to
express his outrage. The result of this resort to self-help was an inter-
national crisis.
Alas, to the great consternation of politicians and diplomats, indi-
viduals often act in ways that complicate efforts to regulate interna-
tional affairs. Examples abound from every period of U.S. history.
During the Washington administration, Gideon Henfield insisted on
fighting alongside the French against the British, in violation of U.S.
neutrality. 93 Settlers provoked wars with Native Americans, seeking
to force the government into wars of conquest. At the turn of the last
century, William Randolph Hearst propelled the United States into
war with Spain. Citizens of varied political persuasions opposed U.S.
entry into World War I, while later generations opposed, and short-
ened, the war in Vietnam through a range of legal protest and nonvio-
lent civil disobedience, as well as acts of violence that we would now
label domestic terrorism. Fear of popular reaction to Vietnam-like
entanglements forced our political leaders to limit the use of U.S.
troops abroad for decades-but this, of course, is the essence of
democracy.
United States citizens living abroad often force the U.S. govern-
ment into foreign policy dilemmas. A U.S. teenager living in Singa-
pore engaged in a foolish act of vandalism and was sentenced to be
flogged with a cane. In the midst of a growing international and do-
mestic uproar, President Bill Clinton asked the Singapore government
to suspend the punishment and the United States threatened to block
Singapore's bid to host an international trade meeting. Although the
91. Respublica v. de Longchamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111-12 (Court of Oyer and Terminer,
Phila. 1784).
92. Professor William Casto has cited dozens of references to the incident in the correspon-
dence of the leading political figures of the time. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protec-
tive Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,
492-93 n.143 (1986). In the absence of a federal judiciary, the affair was left in the hands of slow-
moving state officials. Although de Longchamps was eventually convicted in state court, French
officials remained dissatisfied with the manner in which the state had handled the incident. Lack
of federal authority in this and similar cases contributed to the Framers' decision to create a
federal court system.
93. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
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diplomatic dispute gradually abated, the event triggered a period in
which the United States treated Singapore as persona non grata.9 4
During the same time period, the much more serious travails of Lori
Berenson forced the U.S. government to adjust its foreign policy to-
ward Peru. Arrested and charged with participating in acts of terror-
ism in Peru, Berenson was originally tried before a Peruvian military
tribunal. The U.S. opposition to her mistreatment may come back to
haunt the current administration as it pushes for military tribunals in
this country. 95
By comparison, legal claims filed in U.S. courts would appear to
constitute a much less controversial, less threatening avenue by which
citizens can challenge U.S. policies. Nevertheless, litigation initiated
by private citizens has created foreign policy headaches since the earli-
est days of the U.S. government. In 1782, a U.S. privateer captured
the ship the San Antonio in the mouth of the Mississippi river, sailed
it to Massachusetts, and filed a claim to seize it as British property.96
The legal claim provoked a diplomatic battle involving both the
French and Spanish governments. Irate letters forwarded to Congress
alleged that the seizure violated international law because the ship
and its cargo belonged to Spanish citizens and had been seized in
Spanish territory. Congress replied with a resolution noting that the
dispute should be resolved in the courts. Although the Spanish claim-
ants won a decision from the Massachusetts court, the defendants re-
fused to comply with the judgment. During that transitional period
before the ratification of the Constitution, Congress and the federal
government as a whole had little power to assist the foreign litigants
claiming a violation of international law in the San Antonio case, a
shortcoming that contributed to the decision to establish federal
94. See Alejandro Reyes, Rough Justice: A Caning in Singapore Stirs Up a Fierce Debate
About Crime and Punishment, ASIA WEEK. May 25, 1994, available at http://www.corpun.com/
awfay9405.htm (last visited Sept. 7. 2002) (reporting that President Clinton denounced the pun-
ishment as "excessive" and the U.S. trade representative announced that it would oppose Singa-
pore's bid to host 1996 World Trade Organization meeting): Chua Lee Hoong, Time for a
Refresher Course on Singapore Foreign Policy, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, available at http://
straitstimes.asial.com.sg/columnist/0,1886,16-98421.00.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (stating
that "[b~etween 1993 and 1996, following the caning of schoolboy vandal Michael Fay, the Clin-
ton administration in effect relegated Singapore to the status of persona non grata").
95. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S.: New Military Commissions Threaten Rights, Credibil-
itv, Letter to President Bush, Nov. 15, 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/miltribs
ltrl 15.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (expressing concern about Executive Order on military
tribunals, noting that the United States has "routinely condemned" violations of due process
rights, including. for example, the trial of Lori Berenson).
96. The case is described at length in Henry J. Bourguignon. Incorporation of the Law of
Nations During the American Revolution T- 7he Case of the San Antonio, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 270
(1977).
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courts. But it is important to note that even at a time when foreign
policy controversies threatened to thrust our weak nation into war
with the European military powers, Congress saw the judicial process
and the application of the law as the proper response to objections
from abroad.
With the transfer of jurisdiction over such cases to the federal
courts, the federal government obtained the power to enforce its own
judgments. Controversies triggered by individual efforts to enforce
international law in U.S. courts, however, have remained a constant
irritant to the federal government. In the 1790s, the French Ambassa-
dor to the United States sought to file criminal charges for seditious
libel against John Jay, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 97
This political minefield involved the most explosive diplomatic contro-
versy facing the U.S. government at the time: the war between France
and Britain and the United States' determination to preserve a posi-
tion of neutrality. The administration nevertheless maintained a mea-
sured position, informing the ambassador that the government would
not file criminal charges, but he was free to do so through a private
criminal prosecution.
In 1812, private citizens asked the federal courts to seize a warship
belonging to the government of France and declare them to be its
rightful owners. The libelants claimed that the ship had been illegally
seized from them by agents of the French emperor, Napoleon. The
U.S. Attorney submitted a "suggestion" to the court in which he re-
layed the French government's position that the ship was a "public
vessel" of the government of France, lawfully within its possession and
entitled to freely enter and leave the territory of the United States.
At the request of the executive branch, the Supreme Court expedited
its hearing of the case because it involved "political relations" be-
tween the United States and France. The Supreme Court decision in
the case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,98 is now a founda-
tional piece of our law of territorial jurisdiction. The Court wrestled
with and resolved the conflict between principles of absolute territo-
rial sovereignty and the comity offered by one sovereign government
to another, despite the diplomatic minefield surrounding the case.
Another of our most famous precedents, Foster v. Neilson,99 is
remembered for its holding that a "non-self-executing" treaty cannot
be enforced through a private lawsuit in the absence of congressional
97. See William Casto, America's First Independent Counsel: The Planned Criminal Prosecu-
tion of Chief Justice John Jay, I GREEN BAG 21) 353 (1998) (discussing the incident).
98. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
99. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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implementing legislation.100 But the underlying facts of the case in-
volved a struggle over international law and foreign policy. Foster
sought to defend his title to land obtained through a Spanish land-
grant, as promised in a series of treaties ratified by the United States,
Spain, and France. His legal arguments were futile in the face of a
wave of settlers seeking to open the newly obtained Louisiana
purchase to slave-based agriculture. Foster asserted international law
rights over the opposition of the U.S. government. Again, the issues
he raised were duly resolved by the courts, despite their political
sensitivity. lO"
Legal battles over the slave trade also forced the United States into
unwanted confrontations with European powers. Roger Clark has de-
tailed the astonishing legal contortions triggered by the treatment of
human beings as merchandise-as well as the repeated efforts to ob-
tain a definitive statement from U.S. courts that the slave trade vio-
lated international law. 10 2 Justice Story, sitting as a circuit judge,
made such a statement in La Jeune Eugenie,10 3 thrusting the U.S. ju-
diciary into an activist role in the battle to outlaw the slave trade. 10 4
The international legal status of the slave trade reached the Su-
preme Court in The Antelope, 0 5 which addressed the fate of several
groups of Africans seized as slaves, captured by a U.S. privateer and
eventually brought to the United States. 0 6 The ensuing legal battles
pitted the U.S. captain against Spanish and Portuguese citizens, sup-
ported by their governments, who alleged ownership of some of the
Africans. The U.S. government entered the case to argue that their
transport by U.S. citizens into U.S. territory violated U.S. law and
they therefore should be set free. An evenly divided Supreme Court
was unable to resolve the central issue, the validity of the slave trade
under international law, and therefore let stand the lower court deci-
sion that the domestic law of each country would govern. As a result,
some of the Africans were set free while others were returned to for-
eign claimants. The Court again ducked the issue of the international
law status of the slave trade in The Anistad,"17 newly made famous by
100. Id.
101. See Henry J. Richardson III. Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal Histor,:
The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VIL L. L.
REV. 1091 (2000).
102. Clark, supra note 55.
103. 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
104. Id.
105. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
106. Id.: Clark. supra note 55. at 401-Il.
107. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841): see Clark. supra note 55.
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Steven Spielberg. 108 That case forced the Supreme Court to resolve a
dispute involving the governments of Spain and Cuba as well as con-
flicting views from the U.S. government; the Court resolved the claims
by finding that Spanish law applied and rendered the seizure of the
Africans illegal.
In each of these disputes, the individual actions of U.S. citizens and
foreigners forced the judiciary to consider one of the most controver-
sial issues of our foreign and domestic policy. Individual use of the
courts to "meddle" in foreign policy is hardly a product of the late
twentieth century. To the contrary, such actions bear a long pedigree.
Litigation continues to be employed intentionally as a tactic in bat-
tles over U.S. foreign policy, in challenges, for example, to the Viet-
nam War and the Gulf War, the U.S. presence in El Salvador and
Nicaragua, and the intervention in Kosovo. Lawsuits have challenged
U.S. nuclear policy and, currently, the treatment of the detainees held
at the Guantanamo Naval Base. Litigation in each of these examples
has been one tactic among many employed by opponents of U.S. for-
eign policy and by those injured as a result of that policy. But litiga-
tion invokes the peaceful process of the courts, rather than self-help.
Surely, a law-abiding society prefers to encourage lawsuits challenging
foreign policy rather than civil disobedience or other extra-legal
means.
Legal efforts to implement international law and challenge foreign
policy differ from lobbying, political protest, and civil disobedience in
that they seek to invoke the power of the federal government through
an official judicial resolution of the claim. Professor Bradley points to
this as a key distinction between private protest and litigation: "Pri-
vate parties are free in this country, of course, to criticize foreign gov-
ernments on their own. Both the symbolic benefits and the foreign
relations costs of international human rights litigation, however,
largely stem from the official nature of the proceedings." 10 9 But this
official stamp of approval is only obtained in those cases where the
plaintiffs are successful. Where the courts dismiss a case, there is no
such stamp of approval. Clearly meritless claims are generally dis-
posed of through preliminary motions and the courts can impose the
appropriate sanctions where proceedings are frivolous or otherwise
violate court rules. But where claims meet the minimal requirements
of our legal system, the effort required to consider and then reject
108. See Clark. supra note 55.
109. Bradley, supra note 3. at 460 n.12.
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meritless claims is a necessary by-product of a properly functioning
judicial system.
Plaintiffs may seek press coverage of the fact that a court case has
been filed, and the mere filing of a case, even a case that has no merit,
may exert some pressure on the defendants. This is true in all litiga-
tion; as noted, the use of court filings to obtain a strategic advantage is
commonplace in commercial litigation. But the line between the offi-
cial actions of our government and the allegations of a private lawsuit
are clear to our allies and opponents as well. There is no evidence
that the U.S. government has been held responsible by other govern-
ments for unsuccessful lawsuits filed in U.S. courts.
Indeed, the cases that do provoke diplomatic uproars are those that
have the backing of the political branches of the government. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court decision upholding the kidnaping of a sus-
pect from Mexico for trial in the United States triggered a huge
international controversy, not because the judiciary heard and decided
the case, but because the U.S. executive branch urged the Court to
uphold the legality of the kidnapping. 110 Similarly, as discussed in a
later section, human rights litigation under the terrorist state excep-
tion to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is properly seen as a
product of U.S. foreign policy because the statute was recently en-
acted by Congress and signed into law by the President.
Moreover, where the executive branch presents a cogent argument
that pending litigation poses a threat to foreign policy, it generally
finds a receptive judiciary. As discussed in the following section, the
executive branch and the judiciary are well able to short-circuit such
litigation.
B. Human Rights Litigation and Political Questions
The complaint that human rights litigation trespasses upon the for-
eign affairs powers of the executive branch rests upon two grounds.
First, individuals should not be permitted to meddle in issues as to
which they have no competence. Second, the judiciary is constitution-
ally barred from interference in foreign affairs, a result of the constitu-
tional assignment of such issues to the executive branch. I argue
throughout that individual forays into areas that impact foreign affairs
are neither new nor unusual-nor limited to litigation. Indeed,
human rights lawsuits are among the less threatening mechanisms by
110. Mark S. Zaid. Militarv Might Versus Sovereign Right: The Kidnaping of Dr. Humberto
Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 829 (1997) (detailing foreign
government reaction to the Alvarez-Machain case).
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which individuals seek to impact world affairs, far less disruptive than
civil disobedience, much less violent than protest.
The impact of litigation in the United States is limited in part by
application of well-recognized judicial doctrines of restraint. t l Most
important for my purposes, certain cases raising issues of foreign af-
fairs fall within the narrow-and controversial-reach of the political
question doctrine. The doctrine purports to identify certain questions
as inappropriate for judicial review because they constitutionally as-
signed to the other two branches of government. Although issues im-
plicating foreign affairs are within the core of the doctrine's definition,
such cases are not necessarily nonjusticiable. To the contrary, the
Court in Baker v. Carrt 12 stated clearly that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches upon foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance."' 13
Human rights litigation spans a broad spectrum, with domestic as
well as foreign plaintiffs and defendants and events occurring within
the United States as well as abroad. But all such cases have some
connection to foreign affairs, if only because the claims are based
upon international law and thus of concern to other nations as well as
our own. However, as taught by Baker, this foreign connection is not
enough to trigger the separation-of-powers concerns underlying the
political question doctrine. Indeed, most international human rights
cases do not trigger the political question doctrine.
The standard formulation of the political question doctrine, set
forth in Baker, examines whether the issue has been assigned by the
Constitution to one of the other branches, whether there are judicially
manageable standards to resolve it, and whether it involves policy de-
cisions unfit for judicial review, on which the federal government must
speak with one voice. 1 4 Standards developed by the lower courts of-
fer some guidance in applying these factors. One key distinction is
between cases that challenge U.S. foreign policy and those that chal-
lenge only the implementation of policy in a particular case. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit thus would dismiss as nonjusticiable claims
111. As Professor Harold Koh has written. "Rather than applying overbroad rules that treat
all transnational public law cases as inherently unfit for domestic adjudication, courts should
target their concerns by applying those doctrines that have been specifically tailored to address
them." Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation. 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2382-94
(1991).
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
113. Id. at 211.
114. Id. at 217.
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involving "sweeping challenges to the Executive's foreign policy, t1 1 5
while agreeing to resolve "a challenge to one possible method of pol-
icy implementation."' 1t6 Along similar lines, the Second Circuit in
Kadic v. Karadzic'1 7 noted that the constitutionally assigned task of
the judiciary is to resolve individual complaints of violations of legally
protected rights. Where the claim is based in tort, the court said, the
branch of the government "to whom this issues has been 'constitution-
ally committed' is none other than our own-the Judiciary."'1 18 Thus,
human rights litigation fits within the constitutionally assigned task of
the courts: to resolve complaints of unlawful harms filed by individual
plaintiffs against those responsible for their injuries.
In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that where liability is
created by a federal statute, the courts have an obligation to hear the
dispute."t 9 That is, where the legislature-acting within its constitu-
tional powers-has instructed the judicial branch to adjudicate a cate-
gory of claims, the political question doctrine and its separation-of-
powers concerns simply have no relevance. This analysis clearly ap-
plies to cases litigated pursuant to the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the "state sponsors of terror-
ism" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Each is a congressional statute authorizing private plaintiffs to sue in
federal court for violations of human rights. Each defines both the
violations creating liability and the defendants subject to suit. Tell-
ingly, it is suits under the FSIA exception that most threaten to trigger
foreign policy crises. But challenges to these lawsuits on the basis of
the political question doctrine must fail, because the political branches
have authorized the lawsuits.
As to the Alien Tort Claims Act, there is an active and heated de-
bate in academic literature about whether the political branches have,
in fact, authorized its use as a basis for human rights litigation. The
statute itself was enacted over two hundred years ago; the current us-
age is based on cases decided over the past two decades. But it is a
mistake to paint the decisions as products of the judicial branch alone.
The executive branch filed a Statement of Interest in support of the
115. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500. 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
116. Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825. 833 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 249 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro. 937 F.2d 44. 49 (2d Cir. 1991)).
119. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'v. 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (stating that
under the Constitution. one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we
cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones").
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plaintiffs in the very first case, Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala. That statement
specifically rejected resort to the political question doctrine. While
acknowledging that such cases are likely to implicate foreign policy
considerations, the brief concludes that "the protection of fundamen-
tal human rights is not committed exclusively to the political branches
of government." 120
The courts are properly confined to determining whether an indi-
vidual has suffered a denial of rights guaranteed him as an individ-
ual by customary international law. Accordingly, before
entertaining a suit alleging a violation of human rights, a court must
first conclude that there is a consensus in the international commu-
nity that the right is protected and that there is a widely shared un-
derstanding of the scope of this protection. When these conditions
have been satisfied, there is little danger that judicial enforcement
will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to
recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might se-
riously damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the
protection of human rights.1 21
Under President Ronald Reagan, the executive branch later wavered
in its support for the Filirtiga precedent. In a brief filed in a case
against the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Reagan Justice
Department argued that the ATCA should be strictly limited to
human rights abuses that are incorporated in some way into U.S. law
through a separate federal statute imposing criminal sanctions or cre-
ating a civil right of action.1 22 Later filings, however, have again been
supportive, as in a Statement of Interest filed in Kadic that once again
rejected application of the political question doctrine. In response to
the court's invitation to submit its views in that case, the Solicitor
General and the Legal Advisor to the State Department supported
application of the Filtirtiga doctrine, urging the court to assert jurisdic-
tion over the case. The government's Statement of Interest con-
cluded, "Although there might be instances in which federal courts
are asked to issue rulings under the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture
Victim Protection Act that might raise a political question, this is not
one of them." 123
120. Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 12 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 34, 45 (1988).
121. Id. at 46 (footnote omitted).
122. See discussion of U.S. amicus brief in Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493.500 (9th Cir. 1992)
(explaining refusal to be bound by "executive branch's flip on this issue." because the executive
branch views contradicted the plain language of the statute).
123. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250.
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More recent executive branch statements have also accepted the va-
lidity of the Fildrtiga line of cases, while considering the application of
cautionary doctrines on a case-by-case basis. Thus, in a case against
the Unocal Corporation, the State Department opined that resolution
of the case would not have a negative impact upon U.S. foreign pol-
icy. 124 In a case against the Rio Tinto Corporation arising out of min-
ing operations in Papua New Guinea, however, the State Department
noted ongoing peace negotiations in that country and stated that adju-
dication of the lawsuit "would risk a potentially serious adverse im-
pact ... on the conduct of [U.S.] foreign relations."' 25 In response,
the district court dismissed the case.' 26 The courts have also dismissed
ATCA claims arising out of World War II as nonjusticiable political
questions. 127  These lawsuits asked the courts to revisit claims that,
according to the executive branch, had been resolved by the agree-
ments that ended the war. Where the executive branch raises valid
concerns about foreign affairs and the political question, the courts
have given a respectful hearing to the administration's views and gen-
erally have been willing to follow its guidance.
During the same time period, Congress has indicated its support for
the ATCA cases in several ways. The legislative reports accompany-
ing the TVPA, for example, affirm the importance of the ATCA, stat-
ing that the statute "has other important uses and should not be
replaced."'128 Moreover, the TVPA is but one of three recent statutes
enacted in this area that expand upon the ATCA without in anyway
indicating that is should be repealed or narrowed.
124. Letter of Michael J. Matheson. Acting Legal Advisor (July 8. 1997), reprinted in Nat'l
Coalition Gov. of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329. 362 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
[hereinafter Matheson Letter] (stating that "adjudication of the claims based on the allegations
of torture and slavery would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with
the current government of Burma").
125. Sarei v. Rio Tinto. Cir. No. CV 00-11695, 2002 WL 1906814, at *49 (C.D. Cal. July 9,
2002) (amended order granting defendants" motion to dismiss).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., lwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424. 483-89 (D.N.J. 1999) (dis-
missing slave labor claims against German corporations as raising nonjusticiable political ques-
tions). This claim was later settled and the pending appeal withdrawn. A large group of claims
against Japanese defendants have been dismissed, some on the basis of the peace treaties signed
by Japan and others on the statute of limitations. See Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitu-
tion Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INt'L L. 11.26-29 (2002). A Califor-
nia statute attempting to extend the statute of limitations on such claims was declared
unconstitutional as an interference with the federal government's foreign policy powers. In re
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Two
California state courts. however, have upheld the state statute. Bazyler. supra, at 31 n.94. All of
these California cases are currently on appeal.
128. H.R. RiEp. No. 367-102, at 3 (1991). reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84. 86.
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The current interpretation and application of the ATCA is thus a
product of the collective actions of the executive branch and Con-
gress, as well as the courts. With the exception of the Trajano brief
filed in the infancy of this line of cases, the executive branch has re-
peatedly either expressed support for the doctrine or challenged its
application on narrow grounds in particular cases. And Congress has
addressed the general concept of civil remedies for international
human rights abuses three times over the past ten years, each time
broadening the categories of plaintiffs, defendants, or abuses subject
to its reach. The judiciary, therefore, can reasonably conclude that the
adjudication of civil lawsuits on the Fildrtiga model represents the pol-
icy of all branches of the federal government.
C. A Question of Jurisdiction
Modern human rights litigation has been criticized as permitting in-
dividuals to draw the U.S. government into controversies that are
none of its business, forcing the exercise of jurisdiction over events or
people that have no connection to the United States. Most of the his-
torical examples discussed above involved U.S. actors, events that
took place in the United States, or property physically present in the
this country. But most of the modern cases also involve U.S. actors:
the majority are filed against individual or corporate defendants based
in the United States. Even cases filed against individual foreigners
usually involve defendants who are living in the United States, as in
Fildrtiga, where the defendant had relocated to this country precisely
to avoid accountability at home.
A small number of cases address abuses committed abroad by for-
eign defendants in foreign countries. Jurisdiction in these cases is
based upon either the physical presence of transitory defendants or
the minimum contacts of corporations doing business in the United
States. These are the standard rules of jurisdiction applied by U.S.
courts to issues ranging from antitrust to torts and contracts, but are
not followed by the domestic legal systems of most other countries.
Although U.S. courts invoke jurisdiction based on these domestic
rules, the assertion of jurisdiction over human rights abuses commit-
ted abroad is also justified by the international rule of universal juris-
diction. International law permits-and in some situations
obligates-domestic legal systems to assert jurisdiction over a small
class of wrongs considered of universal concern. Universal jurisdic-
tion "recognize[s] that international law permits any state to apply its
laws to punish certain offenses although the state has no links of terri-
tory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the
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victim).' 29 Jurisdiction is based instead on the international commu-
nity's collective interest in sanctioning egregious violations of interna-
tional law. Growing out of the universal prohibition of piracy and the
slave trade, the concept is applied today to violations such as geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture. 30
In situations in which the international community has accepted
universal jurisdiction, the diplomatic repercussions caused by individ-
ual lawsuits in the United States are mitigated. Such cases have strong
support from international law and fit within an expanding interna-
tional movement. Cases based on universal jurisdiction have been
filed in several European countries, as well as in Africa and South
America. Indeed, this common international foundation may account
in part for the fact that there have actually been very few diplomatic
complaints about the U.S. litigation, with the exception of cases filed
directly against foreign governments under the exception to the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act. I turn now to examine the evidence
that modern human rights litigation in the United States does not, in
fact, threaten the delicate balance of our democracy.
D. More a Whimper Than a Bang
My focus up to this point has been to show that individual legal
actions that seek to enforce international law and thereby to influence
foreign policy are well-grounded in international law, the domestic
law of other countries, and our own history and practice. Let me
briefly note here that fears about the foreign policy impact of U.S.
human rights litigation are largely overblown.
First, concerns are often based on surveys of all of the cases that
have been filed, regardless of outcome. Looking at this broad sample,
critics are able to express fears about lawsuits in U.S. courts challeng-
129. THE RESTATEMENI (TmIRD) OF THE FORI-IGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEIMEN-I]. The territoriality principle does not apply to
offenses "generally regarded as offenses of an international character of serious concern to the
international community as a whole, which it is accepted may be punished by whichever state
has custody of the offender." I OIPPENIEIM'S INTERNAIONAL LAWv 469 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds.. 9th ed. 1992). See Roger S. Clark. Offenses of International Concern: Multi-
lateral State Treaot
, 
Practice in the Forty Years Since Nuremberg, 57 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 49 (1988)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of treaty provisions authorizing universal jurisdiction).
130. INrERNATIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION. FINAl RFPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN RESPEC-d OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES 4-9 (2000): Kenneth C. Randall.
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988). The Restate-
ment defines universal jurisdiction as applying to "certain offenses recognized by the community
of nations as of universal concern." and offers as examples a non-exclusive list including "piracy.
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft. genocide and war crimes." RESTATEMENT. supra
note 129. at § 404.
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ing the domestic policies of countries around the world. But a major-
ity of the most criticized cases have been dismissed by the district
courts. It may be true that the media attention afforded to the filing
of a lawsuit may cause some foreign policy discomfort, but there is
absolutely nothing that can or should be done to stop such a legiti-
mate use of our courts. Where cases are frivolous, they can be sanc-
tioned through standard procedures. But rather than blocking access
to the courts for lawsuits that meet the basic requirements of the fed-
eral rules, the federal government should permit the legal process to
deal with such cases on their merits.
Second, as noted, the cases that arouse the most concern are those
against foreign governments, authorized by Congress, with the signa-
ture of the President. There is simply no basis for arguing that plain-
tiffs who file cases authorized by the political branches, or judges who
resolve them, are interfering with the foreign policy prerogatives of
those two branches. Where the executive branch and Congress have
decided that individual actions are authorized, concerns about separa-
tion of powers are simply misplaced.
Finally, a word about another category of cases that has aroused
protest: human rights cases filed against corporations. Here again,
there are several sub-categories. Cases filed against corporations for
abuses committed during World War II have triggered significant out-
rage. But these cases are truly sui generis, both in terms of the issues
they raise and the successful settlement of several of them. Some
were dismissed at the urging of the executive branch. Many settled,
but only in part because of the leverage exerted by the litigation-
political pressure outside of the courtroom and economic pressure
through threats to boycott the defendant corporations and banks
played an important role.
A more pertinent set of cases are those filed against corporations
for recent or ongoing human rights abuses, such as those against
Royal Dutch Petroleum, Unocal, Texaco, and Chevron. Most of these
do not actually raise foreign policy concerns-either the governments
involved did not object or our government dismissed their objections.
The executive branch, for example, showed little concern about the
complaints of the government of Burma, a military regime that has
been severely criticized and ostracized by our government. 131 Where
131. See Matheson Letter. supra note 124 (stating that "adjudication of the claims based on
the allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign
relations with the current government of Burma").
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the state department did raise concerns about the impact on U.S. for-
eign policy in a recent case, the district court dismissed the claims.' 32
Indeed, the foreign protests raised by these cases pale in compari-
son to the howls heard in cases such as Hartford Fire,133 where our
allies filed protests over the U.S. assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
insurance companies. One of the more exasperating aspects of the
critique of "plaintiff's diplomacy" is the sense that human rights cases
are being subjected to more exacting scrutiny than garden variety tort
and contract claims. Domestic and foreign corporations are routinely
sued in U.S. court for acts that occurred abroad. Why should they not
also be subject to suit for human rights violations committed in the
same location?
V. CONCLUSION
Complaints about individual enforcement of human rights and the
danger such efforts pose to foreign policy raise both legal and policy
concerns. Legally, I argue, such claims fall comfortably within the
structures of international law, the domestic law of nations around the
world, and our own legal traditions. As a matter of policy, the risks
posed by such lawsuits are minimal. On the other hand, efforts to
close the courtroom door to such claims would indeed threaten demo-
cratic values.
Furthermore, government efforts to restrain individual enforcement
mechanisms highlight complaints about the very nature of state sover-
eignty. Most human rights prohibitions are defined as restraints on
government powers.1 34 Individual enforcement of human rights
norms generally pits the individual against a state, challenging both
violations of international law and the failure to provide domestic
remedies. Governments are obligated both to refrain from commit-
ting human rights abuses and to afford those injured by such abuses
remedies by which they can seek redress. 3 5 Thus, human rights en-
132. Sarei. 2002 WL 1906814. at *1.
133. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
134. The Torture Convention, for example, defines certain acts as torture when "inflicted by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment. Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, § 1. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR.
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force for the United States Nov. 20.
1994).
135. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states explicitly: "Everyone has the right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating ... fundamental rights
.... Universal Declaration of Human Rights. art. 8. G.A. Res. 217A (1ll). U.N. GAOR. 3d
Sess.. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also ICCPR, supro note 63, at art. 2(3) (specify-
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forcement generally involves an individual victimized by state repres-
sion who seeks redress against a government, its officials, or those
who act in concert with them.136
Although the nation-state has proven to be a tremendous force of
stability in the modern world, it also carries with it the danger of un-
checked repressive power over those subject to its control. For many,
the sovereign state remains an "iron cage" from which they are
"obliged to communicate with the outside world, in a legal sense,
through very close-set bars."' 137 Even with the inroads that followed
World War 1I and the human rights movement of the past decades,
many individuals continue to be confined within the "cage" of their
own government. Individual enforcement of human rights norms con-
stitutes an attempt to break through the walls erected by states to pro-
tect their monopoly of power.
Restrictions on individual efforts to enforce international law only
highlight the inconsistencies of a world in which many humans have
no access to remedies for violations of their most fundamental rights.
States have developed detailed rules that govern their own behavior
toward individuals, but have resisted efforts to create comprehensive
enforcement schemes. The existence of rights without remedies ex-
poses a basic tension in the foundations of international law. Individ-
uals are pushing hard to force states to concede that they must
strengthen enforcement mechanisms and hold accountable those who
violate basic rights.
The protection of human rights, as much or even more than other
areas of government policy, cries out for the vigilant involvement of
individual citizens. Government policies must be subjected to probing
challenges that expose hypocrisy and pierce efforts to cover-up com-
plicity. Human rights are too important to be left in the unsupervised
hands of governments. "Plaintiff's diplomacy" is one response to this
challenge.
ing that this "effective remedy" requires states "to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy."
and "to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted").
136. Important exceptions to the state action requirement include genocide and slavery, both
prohibited by international law whether committed by state officials or private actors. Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Dec. 9. 1948, art. 4. 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 23, 1989) (authorizing pun-
ishment of private individuals as well as public officials): Slavery Convention. Sept. 25, 1926. 60
L.N.T.S. 253 (prohibiting slavery under all circumstances). But those same treaties obligate
states to prevent violations and punish private individuals who violate these norms.
137. NICOLAS POLitis. THE NEW AsPEciS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30, 31 (1928).
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